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C O M M E N T S
Should the United States 
Create Trading Markets 
for Energy Efficiency?
by Noah M . Sachs
Noah Sachs is a Professor at the University of Richmond School of Law and Director of the law school’s Robert R . 
Merhige Jr . Center for Environmental Studies . He writes frequently about climate change and energy efficiency .
For over 30 years, the United States has deployed an effective set of policies to promote energy efficiency, including appliance standards, information disclo-
sure requirements, auto fuel economy standards, build-
ing codes, and tax rebates . From 1980 to 2014, the energy 
intensity of the U .S . economy (that is, the energy needed 
to produce one dollar of gross domestic product (GDP)) 
declined by about 50%—a remarkable success story .1 
Energy efficiency policies and technologies were respon-
sible for a substantial portion of that decline .2
Climate and energy experts are now calling for the 
near-complete decarbonization of the U .S . economy by 
the middle of the century,3 raising the question of whether 
the old policy tools to promote energy efficiency are up to 
the task .
Some analysts have suggested that the United States 
could achieve dramatic breakthroughs in energy efficiency 
by packaging energy savings into a tradable commod-
ity called an energy savings certificate (ESCert) . In this 
market-based approach to energy efficiency, companies 
would participate as buyers or sellers of ESCerts, just as 
companies now trade carbon dioxide emissions allow-
ances, wetlands acreage, and fishing quotas . The goal 
of these markets is to incentivize companies to invest in 
energy-efficient equipment and practices that they might 
otherwise overlook, reducing U .S . greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions in the process .
Other countries have already embraced energy efficiency 
trading markets . In 2012, India launched a market involv-
ing energy-intensive industries such as steel, aluminum, 
and cement . When ESCert trading begins later this year 
1 . See Steven Nadel et al ., American Council for Energy Efficient 
Econ ., Energy Efficiency in the United States: 35 Years and Count-
ing iv (2015) (estimating that energy efficiency improvements were respon-
sible for about 60% of the decline in energy intensity and that structural 
shifts in the economy were responsible for the remainder of the decline) .
2 . Id.
3 . See, e.g., James Williams et al ., Sustainable Dev . Solutions Network, 
Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the United States Technical 
Report xii, xiv (2015), available at deepdecarbonization .org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/11/US_Deep_Decarbonization_Technical_Report .pdf .
in India, it will become the largest market-based environ-
mental program in the developing world . France and Italy 
were pioneers in this new kind of environmental market, 
launching programs over a decade ago to improve residen-
tial and commercial energy efficiency .
ESCert trading has never caught on in the United 
States, but these markets nonetheless have an enthusias-
tic group of advocates . Energy policy analysts have called 
ESCert trading a “breakthrough plan”4 that can “unlock 
energy saving potentials”5 and serve as a “market-based and 
credible accounting instrument” to achieve climate change 
goals .6 The thinking is simple: If we can put a price on 
energy savings and make it a tradable commodity, firms 
will innovate to find every available opportunity to save 
fuel and electricity .
This Comment examines whether the vision for energy 
efficiency markets matches the reality . It explains how 
energy efficiency markets work, examines the handful 
of energy efficiency markets that have been established 
to date, and explores the policy challenges inherent in 
commodifying energy efficiency and making it a trad-
able good .
Ultimately, I conclude that the high expectations for 
energy efficiency markets are unlikely to be met on the 
ground . The markets will likely play only a minor role in 
greening U .S . energy demand .7 Programs in other coun-
tries have high transaction costs and encounter persistent 
problems involving energy-savings measurement, target-
setting, governmental oversight, and ensuring the addi-
4 . Lisa Margonelli, Toward an Energy Efficiency Trading System, Wash . Post, Feb . 
9, 2007, http://www .washingtonpost .com/wp dyn/content/article/2007/ 
02/08/AR2007020801294 .html .
5 . EuroWhiteCert Project, White Certificates: Concept and Market 
Experiences 1 (undated), available at http://ec .europa .eu/energy/intelligent/
projects/sites/iee-projects/files/projects/documents/eurowhitecert_brochure . 
pdf .
6 . Edward Vine & Jan Hamrin, Energy Savings Certificates: A Market-Based 
Tool for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 36 Energy Pol’y 467, 474 
(2008) .
7 . See Noah Sachs, Greening Demand: Energy Consumption and U.S. Climate 
Policy, 19 Duke Envtl . L . & Pol’y F . 295 (2009) .
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tionality of energy savings . The markets are complex and 
open to strategic gaming, making it difficult to ensure that 
claimed energy savings have actually occurred . There are 
also clear trade offs between high-quality verification of 
energy savings and keeping the operating costs of the mar-
kets low .
The importance of energy efficiency in climate change 
mitigation cannot be denied; energy efficiency is usually 
the cheapest strategy for reducing GHG emissions . But 
these new trading markets are a notoriously complicated 
means of spurring efficiency, and the United States would 
be better served by expanding well-established energy effi-
ciency policy tools or energy taxes rather than creating new 
markets in ESCerts .
I. Creating Energy Efficiency Trading 
Markets
One preliminary question about these markets is why gov-
ernments would create a new, complex market to incen-
tivize companies to cut their energy consumption . After 
all, profit-motivated firms might be expected to find cost-
effective energy-saving investments on their own .
Most energy economists believe that some policy inter-
vention is necessary to promote energy efficiency because 
markets for electricity and fuel and markets for energy-
efficient equipment are prone to market failures . The result 
is that firms and households do not adopt energy-efficient 
technologies and practices even when doing so would be 
profitable .8 This sub-optimal investment has been dubbed 
the “energy efficiency paradox” or “energy efficiency 
gap,”9 and it leads to an overconsumption of fossil fuels . 
The debate is about which mix of policy tools should be 
deployed to correct these market failures .
As a solution for bridging the energy efficiency gap, 
energy efficiency markets are a legal hybrid . First, they rely 
on a government mandate—an energy-savings target for 
an industry, a region, or individual firms . Second, they 
allow ESCert trading to provide the market participants 
with some flexibility as to how they reach the mandate .
The mandate at the heart of ESCert markets is a quan-
tity-driven quota . While price-driven mechanisms such as 
a carbon tax have been shown to be ineffective in spurring 
many kinds of energy efficiency investments, the quantity-
driven quota guarantees that the obligated firms will, in 
8 . See Adam B . Jaffe & Robert N . Stavins, The Energy Paradox and the Dif-
fusion of Conservation Technology, 16 Resource & Energy Econ . 91, 98-
99 (1994); Stephen J . DeCanio, Barriers Within Firms to Energy-Efficient 
Investments, 21 Energy Pol’y 906, 908 (1993); International Energy 
Agency, Mind the Gap: Quantifying Principal-Agent Problems in 
Energy Efficiency 11 (2007) .
9 . Todd D . Gerarden et al ., An Assessment of the Energy-Efficiency Gap and Its 
Implications for Climate Change Policy (National Bureau for Econ . Research, 
Working Paper No . 20905, 2015), available at http://www .nber .org/papers/
w20905 .pdf .
aggregate, achieve the desired energy-savings goal, such as 
an 8% reduction in energy consumption over five years . 
It should be noted, however, that like any tradable permit 
scheme, the markets rely on some firms not investing in 
energy-efficient equipment or practices . These “laggard” 
firms can instead purchase ESCerts on the market to fulfill 
their savings target . The overall impact of ESCert trading 
on the pace of clean technology innovation is therefore 
hard to predict . The programs are more likely to promote 
diffusion of existing technology rather than foster technol-
ogy innovation .
The ESCerts themselves are government-issued, unique 
and traceable certificates—typically denominated in 
megawatt-hours or tons of oil equivalent10—that purport 
to certify that a firm has achieved a certain improvement 
in energy efficiency or a certain amount of energy savings . 
The programs can be structured either to promote energy 
efficiency (defined as energy used per unit of output of a 
firm) or to promote some specified level of energy savings . 
In the former case, energy consumption may continue to 
rise under these programs if overall output is rising .
In the trading market, companies that can surpass the 
energy efficiency or energy-savings target set by the gov-
ernment will become sellers of the ESCerts, while compa-
nies that fall short of their target are obligated to purchase 
ESCerts to make up their shortfall .
In this way, a “buyer” company can offset a portion of 
its own energy-savings mandate . For a “seller” company, 
the expectation is that the sale price of the credits will 
motivate them to invest in energy-efficient equipment or 
practices . For example, if a business investment in highly 
efficient refrigeration equipment has a nine-year payback 
period from the energy savings, the accompanying sale of 
ESCerts might allow the company to recoup the invest-
ment in six years, making the investment more financially 
attractive . Advocates believe that the added price signal 
from ESCerts will “change mindsets” by making business 
managers focus on energy efficiency opportunities in a way 
that they have not in the past .11
Within this broad outline of an ESCert trading pro-
gram, there is tremendous variation in how the programs 
are structured . In Italy and France, which launched ESCert 
trading markets in 2005 and 2006, respectively, electric 
and gas utilities are the major players in the markets . 
These energy suppliers have to locate the energy savings 
not within their own facilities, but rather in residential and 
commercial buildings owned by their customers . Trading 
of EScerts (also called “white certificates” or “white tags” in 
10 . See Barry Friedman et al ., National Renewable Energy Lab ., Consid-
erations for Emerging Markets for Energy Savings Certificates 6 
(2008) .
11 . See, e.g ., Paolo Bertoldi & Sylvia Rezessy, Institute for Env’t & Sus-
tainability, Tradable Certificates for Energy Savings (White Cer-
tificates): Theory and Practice 35 (2006) .
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Europe) is an adjunct to traditional demand side manage-
ment (DSM) programs in which utilities fund or under-
take upgrades to save energy within their service areas . 
Typical eligible energy-savings projects in Europe include 
distributing compact fluorescent light bulbs to residential 
customers or upgrading home insulation .
India’s new energy efficiency market, called Perform 
Achieve Trade (PAT), has a fundamentally different struc-
ture . Launched in 2012, PAT targets energy end-users in 
industry rather than energy suppliers . PAT covers eight 
energy-intensive industries: fertilizer, cement, pulp and 
paper, textiles, chlor-alkali, iron & steel, thermal power 
plants, and aluminum . India chose to deploy a market-
based approach to energy efficiency because of some 
unique political and economic circumstances . India’s total 
energy consumption is expected to skyrocket over the next 
few decades,12 but per capita energy consumption remains 
low . Unwilling to accept a fixed cap on its GHG emissions, 
India has instead pledged in international climate change 
negotiations to lower the emissions intensity of its economy 
(the amount of GHG emissions per unit of GDP),13 and 
this strategy depends heavily on becoming more efficient 
in energy use .
The PAT program focuses on reducing energy con-
sumed per unit of output by a plant and therefore cannot 
guarantee any absolute level of energy savings . Under PAT, 
478 individual industrial plants were obligated to achieve 
a target improvement in energy efficiency over a three-
year period (2012-2015), and each plant had to achieve 
that improvement within its own fenceline or purchase 
ESCerts from better-performing firms . Rather than man-
dating a uniform improvement in efficiency for an indus-
try (such as a 5% improvement over three years), India’s 
Bureau of Energy Efficiency set a different improvement 
target for each plant, adding to the complexity of the pro-
gram . In 2015, teams of auditors determined whether each 
plant surpassed its target or fell short, and the trading of 
ESCerts in India is expected to begin in mid-2016 . Regard-
less of program structure, there are usually five key steps to 
establish and oversee an energy efficiency trading market: 
1 . Determine which entities will be obligated to achieve 
energy savings or improvements in efficiency .
2 . Set the numeric energy savings or energy efficiency 
target that these entities must achieve within a pro-
gram period (typically 3-5 years) .
3 . Verify whether the obligated entities have surpassed 
the target or fallen short .
12 . See Nathalie Trudeau et al ., International Energy Agency, Energy 
Transition for Industry: India and the Global Context 10 (2011), 
available at http://www .iea .org/publications/freepublications/publication/
india_industry_transition_28feb11 .pdf (reporting that India’s energy con-
sumption is expected to increase by a factor of 3 .5 to 4 .2 by 2050) .
13 . In the run-up to the Paris climate change conference, India committed to 
reduce the emissions intensity of its economy 33-35% below 2005 levels by 
2030 .
4 . Issue ESCerts to the firms that have surpassed their 
target, representing the energy saved by those firms .
5 . Establish and oversee a trading exchange for the 
ESCerts, where sellers can be linked with buyers .
These steps may seem straightforward, but each step 
requires substantial governmental oversight and frequent 
interactions between policymakers and the regulated enti-
ties . Advocates of market approaches to environmental law 
often underestimate how much governmental involvement 
is needed to establish and oversee a credible marketplace . 
Market-based environmental policies still require detailed 
regulations to establish the terms of the property right to 
be traded and the conditions of trading, banking, borrow-
ing, and other matters . Given this reality, energy efficiency 
markets should not be established on the cheap . ESCert 
trading necessitates exacting attention to energy-savings 
measurement and verification and requires careful tracking 
of the certificates . A competent bureaucracy and a network 
of credible auditors are essential for running the system .
Transaction costs are the primary barrier to expand-
ing energy efficiency markets as a climate change mitiga-
tion tool . If ESCert trading is to make a significant dent 
in GHG emissions, countries would have to set aggressive 
targets, verify the energy savings alleged by firms, expand 
the number of players in the market, and potentially link 
ESCert markets with companion markets in renewable 
energy credits (RECs) or GHG emissions allowances . 
Economic theory suggests that the ESCert markets will 
operate most efficiently with the widest possible number 
of participants and a broad range of eligible projects and 
facilities . In theory, thousands of entities could participate 
in the markets .
For instance, if a household could document energy 
savings of 500 kilowatt hours per year, it might package 
that savings into an ESCert (with a third party certifying 
the savings) and then sell the ESCert to some other entity, 
such as a utility, that is obligated to achieve energy savings . 
Market participants might include utilities, energy service 
companies, cities, transportation providers, industrial or 
commercial firms, appliance manufacturers, individuals, 
or real estate developers . The transaction costs of expand-
ing the markets in this way are substantial, however, and 
need to be carefully considered in program design .
II. Energy Efficiency Markets: Potential 
Applications in the United States
In the United States, the most likely purpose for an energy 
efficiency market would be as a mechanism for electric and 
gas utilities to comply with state Energy Efficiency Port-
folio Standards (EEPS), also known as Energy Efficiency 
Resource Standards . Twenty-four states have adopted 
EEPS, which are government mandates for utilities to 
reduce energy consumption in their service areas, and the 
Copyright © 2016 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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programs typically carry a fine or penalty for noncom-
pliance .14 In the electricity sector, EEPS range from Wis-
consin’s 0 .77% savings per year to Massachusetts’ 2 .6% 
savings per year .15
Five states (Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Nevada, and Pennsylvania) have authorized various 
forms of market trading to comply with their EEPS, but 
of these five, trading is active only in Connecticut . The 
most likely explanation for the limited scope of ESCert 
trading is that EEPS in most states are not aggressive, 
representing small increments in energy savings beyond 
business as usual . As a result, utilities have been able 
to achieve their targets on their own initiative, without 
resorting to a trading mechanism .
Connecticut’s legislature authorized ESCert trading in 
2005 because of some unusual features of Connecticut’s 
electricity market .16 Connecticut’s deregulated market 
has more than 30 independent electricity suppliers that 
are obligated to demonstrate a savings, through efficiency 
improvements, of 4% annually .17 They can achieve this 
target through a broad array of eligible savings projects, 
including combined heat and power, load management, 
and demand response .18 Because these suppliers have little 
experience in conducting these programs, however, they 
have instead bought ESCerts from Connecticut’s two large 
electric distribution utilities, United Illuminating and 
Eversource . The utilities have funded the energy efficiency 
upgrades and have become the major sellers of ESCerts to 
the independent electricity suppliers .19
Could an energy efficiency market be established nation-
ally, with interstate trading of certificates? Such a national 
market is highly unlikely to emerge any time soon . In 2009 
and 2010, Democrats introduced several bills establishing 
a national EEPS, but these bills did not authorize any trad-
ing mechanism and none were enacted into law .20
We are unlikely to see national EEPS legislation coming 
out of the Republican-controlled U .S . Congress . Indeed, 
since 2009, the use of cap-and-trade systems to control 
carbon emissions has become anathema on the right, so 
Congress is unlikely to support a national program of trad-
ing in energy efficiency credits to achieve climate change 
goals . Nationwide ESCert markets would also encoun-
ter resistance from ratepayers, who would be reluctant to 
fund energy efficiency upgrades on facilities that might be 
14 . See Karen Palmer et al ., Resources for the Future, Putting a Floor 
on Energy Savings: Comparing State Energy Efficiency Resource 
Standards (2012), available at http://www .rff .org/files/sharepoint/Wor-
kImages/Download/RFF-DP-12-11 .pdf .
15 . See American Council for Energy Efficient Econ ., State Energy Ef-
ficiency Resource Standards, (2015), available at http://aceee .org/sites/
default/files/eers-04072015 .pdf .
16 . See Act of July 1, 2005, Conn . Pub . Acts No . 05-1, June Spec . Sess . (2005) 
(concerning energy independence) .
17 . See Vine & Hamrin, supra note 6, at 471 .
18 . See Friedman et al ., supra note 10, at 28 .
19 . See id. at 31 .
20 . See Save American Energy Act, H .R . 889, 111th Cong . (2010) (sponsored 
by Rep . Edward Markey (D-Mass .)); Save American Energy Act, S .B . 548, 
111th Cong . (2010) (sponsored by Sen . Charles Schumer (D-N .Y .)) . Both 
bills set national goals of 15% electricity savings and 10% natural gas sav-
ings by 2020 .
located thousands of miles away . If energy efficiency mar-
kets are going to take root in the United States, it will likely 
happen at the state level, and ESCert trading would likely 
be restricted to intrastate trades .
States might look to existing REC markets as the most 
natural models for trading in energy efficiency credits . There 
is an important distinction between RECs and ESCerts, 
however, that make ESCert trading far more complicated: 
The renewable energy generation represented by RECs can 
be directly metered, whereas ESCerts purport to represent 
non-use of energy . For a company to assert that it has not 
used energy that it otherwise would have used, entitling 
it to a valuable credit, the purported energy savings must 
be compared against a hypothetical baseline energy con-
sumption for that company . Consequently, ESCert trad-
ing relies far more on estimation and projection than other 
kinds of market-based environmental policies, and the 
transaction costs of an ESCert market are far higher than 
the transaction costs of an REC market . As two European 
analysts put it (understatedly), energy efficiency markets 
are “rather demanding with respect to design and opera-
tion of the system .”21
III. Policy Challenges for Energy Efficiency 
Trading
There are four central challenges that policymakers would 
have to overcome to establish credible energy efficiency 
markets: measuring and verifying energy savings, ensur-
ing additionality, setting environmentally meaningful pro-
gram targets, and maintaining the system boundary . As 
I discuss below, the experience with other environmental 
markets does not provide much confidence that these chal-
lenges can be addressed at reasonable cost .
A. Measuring and Verifying Energy Savings
For energy efficiency markets to work effectively, regula-
tors must be able to verify that claimed energy savings have 
actually taken place, or else market participants will be 
trading in bogus energy reductions . The existing ESCert 
trading markets have relied on two broad approaches for 
measurement and verification . The European ESCert 
trading markets rely principally on an ex ante, “deemed 
savings” approach .22 Energy regulators simply “deem,” or 
credit, a pre-specified amount of energy savings when elec-
tric and gas utilities implement energy-saving techniques 
for their residential and commercial customers .23 This 
approach provides financial liquidity because the ESCerts 
21 . Nicola Labanca & Adriaan Perrels, Editorial: Tradable White Certificates—
A Promising but Tricky Policy Instrument, 1 Energy Efficiency 233, 234 
(2008); see also Vine & Hamrin, supra note 6, at 475 (concluding that the 
“most important issue” with tradable energy efficiency certificates “is the 
problem of transaction costs”) .
22 . See Vine & Hamrin, supra note 6, at 469-71; Paolo Bertoldi & Silvia 
Rezessy, Joint Research Centre of European Comm’n, Energy Sav-
ings Obligations and Tradable White Certificates 22 (2009) .
23 . See Vine & Hamrin, supra note 6, at 471 .
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are earned upfront, and it reduces transaction costs because 
no auditor has to conduct field checks on an ex post basis to 
measure the actual energy savings . In France, for example, 
utilities can choose from a menu of over 100 projects listed 
in the regulations, with associated deemed energy savings 
for each .24
One disadvantage of the deemed-savings approach is 
that there is no field check to ensure that customers are actu-
ally using the energy-saving devices supplied by utilities . In 
addition, by incentivizing deployment of well-known, off-
the-shelf energy efficiency upgrades, the deemed-savings 
approach appears to undercut one of the primary rationales 
for trading: that trading will link firms that have varying 
marginal costs of compliance . Firms are instead likely to 
have similar marginal costs of compliance if they are all 
selecting from the same standardized menu of efficiency 
upgrades . Moreover, the deemed-savings approach does 
little to encourage transformational improvements in the 
energy efficiency of products, equipment, or materials . It 
does nothing, for example, to encourage superior building 
or materials design .
The deemed-savings approach still necessitates complex 
energy and financial accounting because regulators must 
develop a credible reference case scenario . Assume, for 
example, that a utility offers rebates to homeowners to pur-
chase super-efficient water heaters . Regulators would need 
to develop a reference case of energy consumption in which 
homeowners are instead relying on a mix of water heaters 
with varying efficiencies and life-spans . Once the data is 
compiled to determine that reference case, regulators can 
then estimate the likely energy savings from the rebate pro-
gram for the purpose of awarding ESCerts .
An alternative to the ex ante, deemed-savings approach 
is the ex post approach used in India . Under the PAT pro-
gram, regulators calculate the baseline energy efficiency of a 
particular plant (energy used per unit of output) . They then 
assume that baseline will continue, set a target improve-
ment in efficiency, and after three years, measure the new 
energy efficiency of the plant . This approach has the advan-
tage of confirming energy efficiency improvements with 
real field data, but it presents substantial transaction costs: 
The changes in energy consumption per unit of production 
at each plant must be measured in the field, through ex 
post auditing at the end of each program period, and this is 
a substantial task for the 478 plants in the program . More-
over, the energy measurements at each plant are conducted 
by a network of third-party auditors,25 raising the possibil-
ity of corruption in the program . In India, corruption in 
environmental law is a persistent problem .26
24 . See Paolo Bertoldi et al ., Energy Supplier Obligations and White Certificate 
Schemes: Comparative Analysis of Experiences in the European Union, 38 En-
ergy Pol’y 1455, 1461 (2010) .
25 . See Rajesh Kumar & Arun Agarwala, A Sustainable Energy Efficiency Solu-
tion in Power Plant by Implementation of Perform Achieve and Trade (PAT) 
Mechanism, 2 Open J . Energy Efficiency 154, 158-59 (2013), available 
at http://dx .doi .org/10 .4236/ojee .2013 .24020 .
26 . See Michael Faure, Bucking the Kuznets Curve, 51 Va . J . Int’l L . 95, 99-100 
(2010); Mahesh C . Mehta, The Accountability Principle: Legal Solutions to 
Break Corruption’s Impact on India’s Environment, 21 J . Envtl . L . & Litig . 
Indeed, one of the overlooked problems with energy 
efficiency markets in India and elsewhere is that the mar-
kets are ripe for fraud . Both the buyer and the seller of an 
ESCert have every incentive to look the other way regard-
ing whether an ESCert represents real, verified energy sav-
ings . The seller has an incentive to inflate energy savings 
or energy efficiency gains to earn the certificates, and the 
buyer, which is using the certificates for compliance pur-
poses, has little interest in the accuracy of the estimates 
used to generate the certificates . Only regulators them-
selves (or their third-party delegees) have a stake in main-
taining the overall credibility of the market .
This same system of incentives also prevails in carbon 
offset markets such as the United Nations’ Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (CDM) . Launched in 2003, the CDM 
has been plagued with problems of inaccurate baseline 
estimation, carbon-accounting, and fraud, leading one 
author to conclude that the CDM “is a Rube Goldberg-
esque scheme that is neither efficient nor self-regulating .”27 
ESCert trading has many parallels with the CDM because 
in both markets, the credits are issued against a counterfac-
tual baseline of energy consumption or carbon emissions, 
respectively, that must be projected over a number of years . 
Both markets offer only the illusion of environmental 
progress if the underlying carbon or energy-accounting is 
not done correctly .
B. Ensuring Additionality
Even if energy savings can be accurately measured, regu-
lators must also ensure that the energy savings are addi-
tional; that is, that the savings are due to the program and 
would not have occurred anyway . As two American ana-
lysts have noted, “determining additionality is inherently 
problematic because it requires resolving a counterfactual 
question: what would have happened in the absence of the 
specific project?”28
Consider the hypothetical rebate program discussed 
above for super-efficient water heaters . If a gas utility could 
show that 10,000 customers applied for the rebate and 
installed the heaters, it should not be entitled to ESCerts 
representing the full extent of energy savings, because some 
portion of the customer base would have installed those 
heaters anyway, even without the incentive . This is just one 
example of the challenges of determining which changes 
in energy consumption in a utility’s service area are due 
to utility DSM programs and which changes would likely 
have occurred anyway .
If U .S . states were to establish energy efficiency markets 
and then award ESCerts for non-additional energy sav-
ings, it would create two problems . First, it would provide 
141 (2006) . [Editor’s Note: For more information on India’s efforts in the 
environmental justice field, see Navya Jannu, India’s National Green Tribu-
nal: Human Rights and the Merits of an Environmental Court, this issue at 46 
ELR 10474 .
27 . Tyler McNish, Carbon Offsets Are a Bridge Too Far in the Tradable Property 
Rights Revolution, 36 Harv . Envtl . L . Rev . 387, 387 (2012) .
28 . Vine & Hamrin, supra note 6, at 472 .
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a windfall to the recipient firm, and second, it may actually 
undermine a state’s environmental goals because that firm 
can sell the credit to another firm that has fallen short of 
its energy-savings target . Indeed, as several researchers have 
noted, adding a trading component to a state EEPS can 
eviscerate the EEPS if some utilities in the state are already 
surpassing the EEPS on a business-as-usual basis .29 In this 
situation, where some utilities are already achieving more 
energy savings than the EEPS requires, the utilities will 
flood the market with their ESCerts, allowing the worst-
performing utilities to buy cheap ESCerts rather than 
make fundamental changes to reduce energy consumption 
in their service areas .
There is no single method or mechanism to ensure addi-
tionality . Ensuring additionality requires exacting energy 
and financial accounting and attention to broader changes 
in energy markets that constitute the “baseline .” To ensure 
additionality, regulators must avoid double-counting effi-
ciency improvements created by other programs (such as 
tax breaks for installing efficient appliances or other equip-
ment), and they also must ensure that the claimed energy 
savings are additional to background improvements in 
energy efficiency being experienced in particular industries 
or in the economy as a whole .
In the United States, additionality of energy savings 
would be difficult to track because there are multiple poli-
cies and incentives in place to encourage household, com-
mercial, and industrial efficiency, including tax credits, 
product subsidies, government procurement requirements, 
efficient building codes, and research and development 
subsidies .30 All of these policies affect the baseline against 
which the ESCert credit is being issued .
Other countries have not satisfactorily solved addi-
tionality problems in their energy efficiency markets . For 
example, Italian electric utilities have earned ESCerts 
for distributing compact fluorescent light (CFL) bulbs 
to their customers,31 but many customers would have 
purchased CFLs on their own without utility assistance, 
as U .S . consumers have done .32 India’s PAT program 
appears to ignore the issue of additionality entirely . As 
long as a plant surpasses its energy efficiency target, 
the Bureau of Energy Efficiency will award it ESCerts, 
without regard to whether the plant would have sur-
passed that target anyway to save fuel, electricity, or 
other expenses .
C. Setting an Environmentally Meaningful Target
A third challenge with ESCert trading is setting the energy 
savings target . The transaction costs of establishing and 
29 . See Joe Loper et al ., Alliance to Save Energy, Deal or No Deal? Pros 
and Cons of Trading Under an Energy Efficiency Resource Stan-
dard 5-183, 5-190 (2008) .
30 . See Loper et al ., supra note 29 .
31 . See Bertoldi & Resezzy, supra note 22, at 16 .
32 . See Joe Loper et al ., Alliance to Save Energy, Scaling-Up Energy Effi-
ciency Programs: The Measurement Challenge 12-14 (2010), available 
at http://www .ase .org/sites/ase .org/files/energy_measurement_challenge_0 .
pdf .
overseeing these markets seem tolerable only if the under-
lying energy savings target is substantial, representing a 
steep gain over business-as-usual improvements in energy 
efficiency . With a substantial energy-savings target, it is 
more likely that firms will have varying marginal costs of 
compliance, a necessary condition for trading to lower the 
overall cost of achieving an energy-savings goal .
In the programs established to date, however, countries 
appear to have established lax savings targets . India, for 
example, required its industrial facilities to achieve, on 
average, a 5 .8% improvement in energy efficiency over 
three years, but this closely tracked the business-as-usual 
improvements that the plants had been making on their 
own initiative over the prior decade .33 In Europe, trading 
volumes in the ESCert markets have been low, suggesting 
that the participating utilities have been able to meet their 
savings targets on their own accord . The European Com-
mission has concluded that “over-compliance has been 
observed in all the existing schemes in the EU, which  .  .  . 
signals unimposing targets in comparison to economic 
saving potential .”34 A report on the Connecticut program 
found that Connecticut’s mandatory EEPS was driving 
investments in energy efficiency in that state, not the trad-
ing component of the program .35 Just as in the European 
programs, the report documented a massive oversupply of 
ESCerts in the Connecticut market .36
The lax target-setting in energy efficiency markets likely 
reflects the political environment in which ESCert trading 
is being proposed . Because ESCert trading is a relatively 
new policy tool, regulators likely proposed low targets to 
win the support of key stakeholders, with the hope that the 
energy-savings targets could be ramped up over time . But 
after many years of operation, most of the programs have 
failed to achieve scarcity in the ESCert marketplace .
It is possible, of course, for regulators to establish far 
more ambitious energy-savings targets, perhaps to meet 
increasingly ambitious pledges under the Paris Agreement 
between now and 2030 . But it seems that lax targets in the 
existing ESCert programs are not an aberration . Rather, 
they reflect a larger trend of overallocation and insufficient 
stringency in many market-based policies in environmen-
tal law .
In cap-and-trade programs, for example, one scholar 
has documented a pattern of weak caps that require little 
change in behavior from regulated industries, drawing 
examples from the U .S . acid rain program, California’s 
RECLAIM program, and the European Emissions Trad-
ing System (ETS) .37 Weak caps mean an absence of market 
scarcity and a correspondingly weak price signal for firms 
to change their behavior . Because of weak caps in the Euro-
33 . See Soumya P . Garnaik, Bureau of Energy Efficiency, Perform, 
Achieve and Trade (PAT), BEE Experience 5, available at www .iipnet-
work .org/PAT-ppt_BEE%20Doc%209 .pdf .
34 . Bertoldi & Resezzy, supra note 22, at 49 .
35 . Joe Loper et al, Alliance to Save Energy, Energy Savings Credits: 
Are the Potential Benefits Being Realized? 6 (2010) .
36 . Id. at 20 .
37 . Leslie McAlister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving To-
ward Stringency, 34 Colum . J . Envtl . L . 396, 398-410 (2009) .
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pean ETS, for example, allowance prices have remained 
below eight euros per ton of carbon dioxide for over three 
years,38 far below expectations, and the ETS is now widely 
derided as “lifeless”39 and “moribund .”40 Research suggests 
that the weak targets in many market-based environmen-
tal programs reflect the political economy of enacting the 
programs, where regulators can overcome opposition from 
regulated industries only by establishing targets that do not 
require substantial behavioral change .41
D. Defining the System Boundary
One final challenge with establishing trading markets for 
energy efficiency is defining the system boundary—the 
question of how regulators should define the geographic 
boundary of a participating firm, region, or facility .
In cap-and-trade programs for GHG emissions, sources 
may react to one jurisdiction’s climate mitigation policies 
by relocating outside the geographic boundaries of regula-
tion or subcontracting production outside those boundar-
ies—the well-known problem of “carbon leakage .”42
Energy efficiency markets are prone to a similar prob-
lem, which I call “energy-savings leakage .” It is easy to see 
how this problem would arise with state EEPS policies if 
ESCerts were tradable across state lines . If State A has a lax 
energy-savings target that is easily surpassed by utilities, 
and those utilities are offering large amounts of ESCerts for 
sale, State B’s more ambitious energy-savings goals could 
be undermined . Utilities in State B would choose not to 
expend resources on DSM programs to conserve energy if 
they could simply buy cheap cross-state ESCerts from State 
A . It is for this reason that state energy efficiency markets 
would likely need to restrict trades to in-state actors .
A different system boundary issue arises if a program 
targets energy savings from industry, as in India’s PAT 
program . The concern is that firms could achieve improve-
ments in energy efficiency, and earn valuable ESCerts, by 
outsourcing their energy-intensive operations to other firms 
that are not regulated in the market .43 A textile plant, for 
example, could improve its energy efficiency profile simply 
38 . For historical trends in EU ETS allowance prices, see Carbon Emis-
sions Futures, Investing .com, http://www .investing .com/commodities/
carbon-emissions-streaming-chart .
39 . Christian Oliver & Pilita Clark, EU Plans to Revive Lifeless Carbon Market, 
Fin . Times, Oct . 13, 2014, http://www .ft .com/intl/cms/s/0/23d2b622-
4fce-11e4-a0a4-00144feab7de .html .
40 . Carl Mortished, EU Trading Market Collapses, Coal Cheap as Dirt, Globe & 
Mail, Apr . 17, 2013, http://www .theglobeandmail .com/try-it-now/try-it-
now-executive-insight/?contentRedirect=true&articleId=11311111&referr
er=https%3A%2F%2Fwww .google .com .
41 . See McAlister, supra note 37, at 426 .
42 . Julia Reinaud, International Energy Agency, Issues Behind Com-
petitiveness and Carbon Leakage: Focus on Heavy Industry 3 (2008), 
available at https://www .iea .org/publications/freepublications/publication/
Competitiveness_and_Carbon_Leakage .pdf (defining carbon leakage as 
“the ratio of emissions increase from a specific sector outside the country 
(as a result of a policy affecting that sector in the country) over the emission 
reductions in the sector”) .
43 . India has adopted a “gate-to-gate” accounting concept that examines ef-
ficiency improvements within the physical perimeter of the plant . See Gov-
ernment of India, Bureau of Energy Efficiency, PAT Consultation 
Document 16-17 (2011) .
by outsourcing its dyeing operation elsewhere . The plant 
would show the same annual output of textiles with far 
lower energy consumption, suggesting that it has improved 
its energy efficiency, even though in reality it has simply 
outsourced part of its operation .
Market enthusiasts are overlooking this important 
structural constraint on energy efficiency markets: It mat-
ters a great deal how regulators define the “facility” to be 
measured . If, as advocates suggest, thousands of entities 
could participate in a single market, the problem of defin-
ing the “facility” to be measured and monitored becomes 
intractable . What would it mean to claim that a certain 
industry, plant, or building has “achieved” energy sav-
ings compared to some baseline? How would regulators 
delineate the boundary of the facility to be measured? 
With dynamic economies, low-cost shipping, and an infi-
nite ability for any facility to contract out operations, the 
accounting challenge is daunting .
IV. Conclusion
Improving energy efficiency is critical for reducing GHG 
emissions . On our current intensive path of energy use, 
global energy consumption is projected to rise nearly 40% 
by 2040,44 and most of that energy will come from fos-
sil fuels . Avoiding that dramatic rise in consumption will 
require both energy-efficient technology development and 
significant behavioral change .
Despite over a decade of theoretical work about ESCert 
trading and the existence of a few operating models, the 
extent to which ESCert trading is generating real envi-
ronmental benefits remains unclear .45 The United States 
should not rush to embrace market trading for energy effi-
ciency when so many other policy tools to promote energy 
efficiency are working effectively . The core elements of U .S . 
energy efficiency policy should remain vehicle fuel economy 
standards, building codes, lighting and appliance stan-
dards, energy taxes, utility DSM policies, and information 
provision . In comparison to these tested policies, ESCert 
trading markets are complex—an “elaborate instrument”46 
that requires substantial government oversight—and the 
markets are hampered by persistent problems of measure-
ment and verification . If governments remain reluctant 
to set energy-savings targets that are substantially more 
aggressive than business as usual, ESCert trading can be 
superfluous or even counterproductive .
Those interested in the potential of ESCert trading 
should closely watch India’s new PAT program . Trad-
ing will begin later this year, and a second round of 
energy efficiency targets for industry will be unveiled 
as well . PAT deserves close scrutiny to see whether it 
can credibly slow the rate of growth in India’s indus-
trial energy consumption .
44 . See International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2014: Ex-
ecutive Summary, available at http://www .iea .org/publications/freepubli-
cations/publication/WEO_2014_ES_English_WEB . pdf .
45 . See Loper et al ., supra note 35, at 34 .
46 . Labanca & Perrels, supra note 21, at 1 .
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The challenges of institutional design discussed in 
this Comment underscore that market-based trading 
policies are not a panacea for achieving environmental 
goals . Indeed, in the context of energy efficiency, if the 
programs are poorly designed, without adequate atten-
tion to verification and additionality, tradable permits 
can actually undermine environmental goals by allow-
ing firms to use bogus credits to meet their energy-
savings requirements . Given the need to reduce energy 
consumption, especially in the developed world, policy-
makers should focus their attention on more promising 
energy efficiency policies .
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